Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute
Equality of Educational Opportunity: Race and Finance
in Public Education
by
Cynthia McDaniels
Public Education and Equality
Public
education in the United States has played a major role in shaping society. The
schools have often assumed the position as both agents and enforcers of
political, economic and social concerns. Joel Spring, in addressing the issue
of the purpose of American education, underscores the complex and controversial
relationship of education and society.
“Even more important than the question of whose social
and moral values should permeate the school is the question of whether the
school should be involved in social reform or improvement. The reason schools
have gotten involved with so many social problems is that the school is the
most available institution and the one least likely to affect other parts of
the social system.”1
The relationship of education to the tenets of
American society is extensive, profound, and complicated. Chief Justice Warren
in the landmark Brown
case used the
judiciary to underscore the importance of education as a function of the
government.
“It (education) is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principle instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”2
At times, the educational dimensions of a social
problem ripples to the larger community, but more frequently, the societal
issues abound and ricochet throughout the schools.
“A broad spectrum of special social problems continues
to create exceptional needs for many North American students as they encounter
life in school. The effects of factors such as divorce, domestic violence,
abuse, and neglect take an awesome toll on children. Young people who
experience the effects of major social upheavals and/or personal disabilities
need special, intervention strategies to assist them in school.”3
Equality
If there is
one principle that Americans have had problems coping with, it is the concept
of equality. The statement that “all men are created equal” has been fraught
with adversity, misinterpretation, and denial. Kluger addresses the dilemma in Simple Justice.
“If an American because his skin is dark, cannot eat
lunch in a restaurant open to the public school; if he cannot send his children
to the best public school available; if he cannot vote for the public official
who represents him; if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which
all of us want, then who among us would be content to have the color of his
skin changed and stand in his place?
Who among us
would be content with the councils of patience and delay? One hundred years of
delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet their heirs,
their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not freed from the bond of
injustice; they are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this
nation, for all its hopes and all its boasts, will not be fully free.
We preach
freedom around the world, and we mean it. And we cherish our freedom here at
home. But are we to say to the world and much more importantly to each other
that this is the land of the free, except for the Negroes; that we have no
second-class citizens, except Negroes; that we have no class or caste system,
no ghettos, no master race, except with respect to Negroes?”4
What is equality and what role should public education
play in equalization are two of the fundamental questions that arise? For most
Americans, equality of opportunity means that no one should be denied equal
access to citizenship rights. Spring sums up the popular interpretation of
equality.
“Equality of opportunity means that all members of a
society are given equal chances to enter any occupation or social class. It
does not mean everyone will have equal income and equal status, rather, all
have an equal chance to compete for any place in society.”5
Nowhere has the misunderstanding been more
highlighted, than in public education. Not only have fierce battles been waged,
but some of the most serious attempts to correct the inherit conflicts, have
occurred in the schools. Bussing, multi-cultural education, vouchers, funding,
bilingualism, federal and state legislation, and judicial mandates are some of
the notable efforts employed in recent years to equalize educational resources,
practices, and opportunities.
Jeanne Oakes
asserts that the idea of educational equality advanced in the sixties and
seventies was extravagant and naive. The well-intentional goals to equalize may
have jeopardized our ability to compete on a global level. In defense of
tracking which makes no claim to promote equality, Oake’s position pointedly is
distanced from the idea of equality and public schools.
“Given the precarious position of the United States in
the global competition for economic, technological, and military superiority,
we can no longer sacrifice the equality of our schools to social goals. This
view promotes the judicious spending of limited education resources in a way
that would produce the greatest return on “human capital.” Phrased in these
economic terms, special provisions for under achieving and minority students
become a bad investment. In short, equality is in; academic excellence is out.”6
Many Americans have tried to overcome the historical
legacy of slavery, disenfranchisement and prejudice in all forms against the
less powerful and minority in our society, that forms the basis for so many
inequities in the United States. The schools, since 1954, have undertaken a
commitment (voluntary and forced) to reduce some of the blatant disparities in
the quest for equality. However, goodwill on the part of individuals and
agencies in the society are inadequate and incapable of effecting the kind of
change that is so often articulated and desperately needed.
The judiciary
has taken a pro-active stance in defining, clarifying, and applying the concept
of equality. The Constitution was very clear concerning equality. At the time
of the writing of the Constitution, blacks were not considered citizens and
when they finally acquired citizenship, their plight was still an affliction.
“Blacks were openly classified as property, and even
those who were not held in legal slavery generally were regarded as having been
placed on earth to do the bidding of white men. The Thirteenth Amendment
technically ended that state of formal subjugation in 1865. The second stage
promoted the colored man to the category of marginal human being, evidently of
the same species as the white and technically entitled to the same rights and
protection, but an unfortunately witless, lecherous, odoriferous sort whose
very presence was an eyesore as the nation reached for greatness. Denied
learning, denied all but the most primitive vocational training, denied access
to the political and social institution that functioned as a giant ethnic
melting pot for the European people who stocked American shores, the Negro
hobbled into the twentieth century as a reviled scapegoat for the frustrated, a
target for the sadistic, and an inconvenient reminder past sins and current
indifference. It seemed only natural that he should have been segregated as a
pollutant. Not until the Supreme Court acted in 1954 did the nation acknowledge
that it had been blaming the black man for what it had done to him. His
sentence to second-class citizenship had been commuted; the quest for meaningful
equality—equality in fact as well as law had begun.”7
The status of blacks was tightly interwoven into the
economic system. Judicial decisions, including the famous Dred Scott case, addressed the black man
as property, and not as a human being with feelings, or a citizen with rights.
Obviously the
original conceptual framework acknowledged and accepted inequality on racial
grounds. Robert Burt in The
Constitution
in Conflict,
asserts,
“It is clear (as clear as historical records can ever
be) that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing, among other
things, equal protection under the law did not intend to invalidate racial
segregation in schools.”8
The Brown case nullified the original intention of
segregation by reinterpreting equality. By voiding the Plessy vs. Ferquson decision which condoned
“separate but equal” (in most comparison cases, segregation was blatantly
unequal) the Supreme Court informed America’s institutions that the fictitious
legal doctrine of dual equity was no longer acceptable. Philip Elman wrote that
segregation had been a social institution for a long time and had a profound
effect on both legal and psychological terms.
“(Segregation is) an institution, which during its
existence not only has had the sanction of decisions of this court but has been
fervently supported by great numbers of people as justifiable on legal and
moral grounds. The Court’s holding in the present cases that segregation is a
denial of constitutional rights involved an express recognition of the
importance of psychological and emotional factors; the impact of segregation
upon children, the court found, can so effect their entire lives as to preclude
their full enjoyment of constitutional rights. In similar fashion,
psychological and emotional factors are involved and must be met with
understanding and good will in the alterations that must now take place in
order to bring about compliance with the Court’s decision.”9
Many factors were considered in the Brown deliberations and ultimate
decision. Of particular significance was the inclusion of social science
findings. Richard Kluger, in his epic analysis of segregation and the Brown case, cites the work of
social scientists Chein and Deutscher in “The Psychological Effects of Enforced
Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion.”
1. Does enforced segregation have detrimental
psychological effects on members of racial and religious groups which are
segregated, even if equal facilities are provided? Response overall: 90 percent
said yes, 2 percent said no, 8 percent said they had no opinion or did not
answer the question. Southern respondents: 91 percent said yes, 6 percent no, 3
percent no opinion or no reply.
2. Does enforced segregation have a detrimental effect
on the group that enforces the segregation, even if that group provides equal
facilities other groups that are segregated? Response overall: 83 percent said
yes, 4 percent said no, 13 percent had no opinion of did not answer. Southern
respondents: 84 percent said yes, 6 percent said no, 10 percent no opinion or
no reply.
3. What is the basis for your opinions? Multiple
answers were provided for; 29.2 percent said they replied on their own
research, 61.1 percent of the research of others, 65.5 percent on their own
professional experience on experience of others.10
The Brown case consisted of a series of lower level court cases
that were grouped together because of the underlying issue of equality. Chief
Justice Earl Warren summarized the legal problem.
“In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race,
through eight legal representatives seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission in the public schools in their community on a non-segregated basis.
In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools being attended by
white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to
race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of these cases
other than the Delaware
case, a three
judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called
“separate but equal’’ doctrine announced by this court in Plessy Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races
are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of
Delaware adhered to the doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted
to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools. The
plaintiffs contend the segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be
made “equal” and hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.”11
The Supreme Court decided on May 17, 1954, that the
fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education was
unconstitutional and stated that all federal, state and local laws must adhere
to the principle. The Court deferred the manner in which this new policy should
be implemented.
“Full implementation of these constitutional
principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementary of the governing
constitutional principles. Because of the proximity to local conditions and
possible need for further hearing, the courts which originally heard these
cases can bent perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it
appropriate remand the cases to those courts.
In fashioning
and effectuating the decrease, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of
these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest
of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as possible on a
nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination
of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated
in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954,
decision. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of
disagreement with them.
While giving
weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that
the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with
our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find
that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective
manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is
necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance
at the earliest practicable date. To what end, the courts may consider problems
related to administration, schools arising from the physical condition of the
school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school
districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and revision
of local law and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing
problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction
of these cases.”12
The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, an organization that led the effort to end racial segregation,
issued the following dispatch to continue to lobby for equality.
“United States Supreme Court today deferred judgment
on five historic cases challenging racial segregation in elementary and high
schools... Postponement comes after three years legal action... Costing
$58,000... Work made possible only through contributions from citizens who
understand significance to national life and impact upon world struggle. Funds
entirely spent. Highest court request preparation of answers within three
months to many broad questions requiring legal argument on historic
constitutional factors, sociological data and authoritative opinion. No money available
to meet emergency...
Opportunity
for decent public education affecting nearly three million Negro American
children depends upon resolution of this dilemma... $15,000 needed immediately
to forestall possibility these youngest must wait decades before equal
opportunity established. Please send your tax deductible gift today to.....”13
The Brown case gave impetus to many Americans to fight for
their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, by strongly embracing the equal
protection doctrine, sent a clear message; where inequalities existed in public
facilities, and where there was discrimination such practices were
unconstitutional. As a further result of Brown, the civil rights movement extended beyond race to
all areas where these was a question of the equal protection clause. The issues
of wealth terms of equality of educational opportunity has featured
significantly in the constitutional interpretation of equality.
The Courts and Funding
Education is a
plenary power of each state. Section 1 of Article 13 of the U.S. Constitution
delegates authority to the state to ‘establish and maintain a system of free
public schools wherein all the children of the state may be educated’.
Educational practices, even though a state function, must conform to the
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. In all 50 state constitutions, the
legislature is given responsibility to determine policy. The local school
districts derive their authority from the state to determine policy. The
following excerpt from the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Deatherage (1948) sums up the strong
legal underpinnings of the relationship of the state and local school
authority.
“A community unit school district, like any other
school district established under enabling legislation, is entirely subject to
the will of the legislature thereafter. With or without the consent of the
inhabitants of a school district, over their protests, even without notice of
hearing, the State may take the school facilities in the district, without giving
compensation therefore, and vest them in other districts or agencies. The state
may hold or manage the facilities directly of indirectly. The area of the
district may be contracted or expanded, it may be divided, united in whole or
in part with another district, and the district may be abolished. All this at
the will of the legislature. The “property of the school district” is a phrase
which is misleading. The district owns no property, all school facilities, such
as grounds, buildings, equipment, etc., being in fact and law the property of
the State and subject to the legislative will...”l4
The state, therefore, retains discretionary power over
the collection, method and distribution of educational funds. It may directly
collect taxes or delegate authority to local school districts to act on its
behalf. One fundamental legal point is that taxes are raised for a public
purpose, namely public education, and how the state apportions the funds is
left to the legislature.
The equal
protection question emerges because of the variation in local school districts
educational expenditures. The level of school expenditures in a district is
mainly determined by the wealth of the local tax base. The real property in
each district is taxed. In some areas, property includes large estates and
broad industrial holdings which generate a large amount of tax revenue. In
contrast, districts, without large industries and high income property will not
have a strong tax base, which in turn will limit the amount of money available
for education. The Serrano
v. Priest
case illustrated district disparities.
John Serrano’s
two children lived in and attended school in a poor Mexican-American community
in Los Angeles. Serrano wanted quality education for his children and felt that
they were denied equal protection because of their lack of wealth. Los Angeles,
like other low expenditure school districts usually have oversized classes,
older and often unattractive buildings, limited auxiliary services, and does
not attract the most qualified teachers. The California Supreme Court agreed
with the plaintiff’s contention in the Serrano case. The court compared the citizens of the Baldwin
Park section of Los Angeles who paid a school tax of $5.48 per $100 of assessed
valuation to the wealthier Beverly Hill residents who were taxed $2.38 per $100
and concluded that the system was unfair.
“We have determined that this funding scheme
invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a
child’s education a function of wealth his parents and neighbors.15
Each state must obviously acknowledge the wide
variations in educational opportunities allowed for children who live in
different school districts throughout the state and the noticeable
discrepancies in expenditures per pupil as well as the disparities in
educational goods and services. Because the school system reliance on the local
tax base, the variation will prevail, simply because some districts are
wealthier than others, based on tax revenue.
Since
education is a state function, it can be held responsible for reducing the
margin between the wealthy and poor school districts. Each state has undertaken
their fundamental obligation to ensure a degree of equality by distributing
equalization aid to local school districts in different ways. Variable
equalizing schemes divides educational needs into monetary units and then
supplements the weaker districts financial capabilities. Variable
non-equalizing plans acknowledge district differences, but makes no special provisions
to the districts. Fixed funding denotes that a standard allowable amount per
unit of educational need is determined and dispersed regardless of the
financial status of the district. Further, the federal government programs have
in many cases, included equalization provisions.
There is no
simple monetary formula to determine equality. Some children require different
services and treatment. The problem of establishing a set standard to measure
education is a formidable, if not impossible undertaking. While there is a high
correlation between wealth and academic achievement, the specific costs,
factors have not been identified and discerned from the non-cost factors.
Sugarman states,
“It may be true that, on the average, the educational
needs of various groups differ, so that instruction effective for one group
would be wasted on another; but it is not necessarily true that costs will
differ in a uniform manner between the different kinds of instruction required
by each group.”l6
The Supreme Court in the San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez case noted,
“Even if it were conceded that some identifiable
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either right, we may have no indication that the present
levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls
short.”17
The Edgewood section of San Antonio, Texas had a
population that was 90% Mexican American, 6% African American and 4% White. The
property tax rate of $1.05 per each $1.00 of assessed valuation yielded $26 for
each pupil. To this $108 in federal and $222 in State Foundation Program Funds
were added. The total pupil expenditure was $356. In contrast, the Alamo
Heights section of the city had an 18% Mexican American enrollment, 1% Black,
and 81% White. The tax rate was 85 cents per dollar of assessed valuation since
the average families property worth was high, the local tax yielded $333 per
pupil. The federal government added $36 and the Texas State Foundation program
added $225, thus spending $594 on each student.
When one
compared the Edgewood and Alamo Heights spending pattern, it revealed that for
every dollar spent on the child from Alamo Heights, only 60 cents was spent on
the child from the Edgewood section of San Antonio. Edgewood was a poor section
in the inner city and predominantly minority, which raised questions of equal
protection in the practice of state supplementary application of funds to the
local district.
The Supreme
Court in a divided decision stated that the state of Texas did not discriminate
against any identifiable class. As far as the court was concerned, the state
provided basic education for every student and promoted local community
participation and control over school expenditures. Further, the fact that
local taxes were unequal was not a constitutional issue. Benefits and spending
in the public and private sector were not always uniform or streamlined.
Justice Powell in delivering the opinion of the court pointed out that education
was not a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
constitution’s equal protection laws. Justice Stewart in concurrence stated,
“The method of financing public schools in Texas as in
almost every other state has resulted in a system of public education that can
fairly be described as chaotic and unjust. It does not follow, however, and I
cannot find, that this system violates the Constitution of the United States. I
join the opinion and judgment of the court because I am convinced that any
other course would mark an extraordinary departure from principled adjudication
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...”18
Connecticut Funding Patterns: A Case in Point
Connecticut,
like many other states, has had to deal with the equality issue. Even though,
there was no dejure segregation, residential patterns and school expenditures
have been unequal throughout the state. The present system of school financing
has developed over the last few years.
In the early 1970’s
Connecticut had an extremely regressive school tax system. The only form of aid
was a flat per pupil grant. Each school system was treated the same. However,
large differences in fund-raising ability limited the educational opportunities
students had if they lived in a less affluent community. This can be seen in
the per student expenditure by different towns. For 1972-73, the median
expenditure was $969. However, the highest was $1570 and the lowest was $670.
This is the type of disparity highlighted in the Rodriguez case. Some schools
were spending more than twice as much as other schools per pupil. These
differences were not by choice, but rather by ability to pay.
A town’s
ability to pay is based upon the value of land and the amount of commercial
development and industry within its borders. There is a huge variation within
the state. The suburban communities, especially the suburbs of New York City
have a greater tax base. In contrast the inner cities, namely New Haven,
Hartford, and Bridgeport have many social problems and little wealth to spend
upon schools. Also the rural farming communities are poor with the little in
the way of taxable assets. If one compared property wealth per student at this
time that Sterling, for example would have $17,441 while Greenwich had $156,564
(the median was $42,746). What this means is that even by having a 32 mil.
school tax only $900 would be raised per student in Sterling. In contrast
Greenwich using only a 4 mil. school tax would be raised $1800 per pupil.
The courts
decided that this inequitable system violated the state constitution by denying
equal access to students because of where they reside. The key court case for
Connecticut is Horton
vs. Meskill.
The state lost both the case and the appeal, and its system of funding
education was declared unconstitutional.
“The discrimination is related rather than absolute.
Further, the children living in towns with relatively low assessable property
values are afforded public education but, as the trial court found, the
education they receive is to a substantial degree narrower and lower in quality
than that which pupils receive in comparable towns with a larger tax base and
greater ability to finance education.
True, the
state has mandated local provision for a basic educational program with local
option for a program of higher quality but, as the court’s findings indicates,
that option to a towns which lacks the resources to implement the higher
quality educational program which it desires and which is available to
property-richer towns highly illusory.”19
This forced the state legislature to develop a new
funding scheme that was more equitable. This new system was known as the
Guaranteed Tax Base Formula of GTB.
The aim of the
GTB was to raise school spending in an equitable manner. The state took the 169
towns in Connecticut and used the 85th percentile as a basis. The GTB aimed to
provide the same ability to pay for education as the towns in the 85th
percentile enjoyed. The state said that it would make up the difference in
funding between a school below the 85th percentile if it had the same tax base
as the town in the 85th percentile. Schools above the 85th percentile are still
forced to rely entirely on the local property taxes for revenues. There was also
a factor for minority aid dependent children enrollments bases on the promise
that they need greater resources to overcome disadvantages.
In addition to
increasing school spending, the GTB also redistributed wealth. The wealthy
suburbs had to shoulder a greater portion of the state’s education costs. The
rural areas were hurt because they lacked a large population and minorities,
two factors in figuring GTB. Also their spending levels on education were so
low that the GTB did not have the desired effects, since it factored in a towns
willingness to pay. The situation did not improve over time and even in 1977-78
Hartford was getting more in state aid per pupil than many of the poorest
communities were spending per pupil. The biggest winner was the largest cities.
They had enough political muscle to push through a generous factor in the GTB
related to minorities and poor. Coupled with the large population of urban
areas and their relatively poor tax base, affluent smaller towns had committed
a great deal of resources to education were receiving less in return.
The state’s
next big initiative came in 1986-87 with the Educational Enhancement Act (EEA).
This bill established a minimum salary for teachers, increased teachers
salaries, and reduced teacher-pupil ratios. This program had a three year
horizon and ran concurrently with the GTB program. Its three years ended in
1988 so the state legislative had to act. The result was the new Educational
Cost Sharing Grant (ECS). This combined the GTB and the EEA grants.
This formula
adds the GTB and EEA then factors in low income students, low mastery tests
scores, 20% of the number of students, and the district’s entitlement to
additional aid. This value is multiplied with a state aid percentage to
determine the amount of aid a town receives. When fully implemented the state
will pay up to 87% of the total educational expenditures of poor towns. It also
penalizes towns that fail to meet the new minimum expenditure requirements.
The new law
attempts to equalize educational spending because it forces towns to spend more
instead of merely encouraging them to do so. Also, it sets limits on the level
of state. By absorbing the present GTB into the new formula and also factoring
in low income students again, cities will get an even greater share of the aid.
While they can surely use this spending, it still has not fully addressed the
problem of school budgets in smaller less affluent communities. Education makes
up 80% of the local budget in many of these towns. Due to this, the town bears
the brunt of any budget cuts. In the Horton vs. Meskill case, the court pointed out that shifting
educational finance to the towns does not reduce the state’s responsibility for
educating its youth.
Connecticut
has also had to address the issue of race in public education. Many of the
salient principles of Brown
I and II have emerged.
A lawsuit was
filed in Hartford Superior Court on behalf of 17 children in Hartford and West
Hartford, claiming that their constitutional rights to equal opportunity and
freedom from discrimination were violated. The lawsuit, Sheff v. O’Neil (1989) also asked the court
to order the racial integration of Hartford and suburban schools. The
plaintiffs included a coalition of civil rights organization as well as
African-American was an unequal covenant that was renewed every generation. The
defendants were the state officials, headed by former Governor O’Neil and
former Education commissioner, Gerald Tirozzi.
Prior to the Sheff v. O’Neil case, the U.S. Civil Rights
documented existence of racially segregated schools in Connecticut. The
Hartford Board of Education and City Council hired Harvard University
consultants who found that low educational achievement in Hartford schools was
closely linked to a high level of poverty and that segregation caused education
damage to minority children. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1966 asked the
governor to seek legislation giving the State Board of Education authority to
integrate local schools.
Again in 1968,
legislation was introduced to authorize the use of state bonds to pay for
racially integrated city-suburban parks. In the same year, the State Board of
Education processed legislation that would authorize the board to cut off money
for school districts that failed to develop acceptable plans to correct racial
imbalance in local schools. In both cases, the legislation was not enacted.
Finally in 1969 the General Assembly passed a law requiring racial balance
within, but not between school districts. The law was not to go onto effect for
10 years.
In 1986 the
State Board of Education adopted guidelines recognizing “the benefits of
residential and economic integration” in Connecticut. A state board advisory
committee issued a report saying there is a “strong inverse relationship
between racial imbalance and quality education in Connecticut’s public
schools.”
The
demographics of Connecticut reveal clearly that Connecticut is segregated by
towns. The cities have largely minority populations and the surrounding suburbs
are mostly white. According to the 1990 census figures, an average of 96.2
percent of the people living in 28 towns around New Haven are white, compared
to just 2.2 percent who are black. In contrast, 36.1 percent of New Haven
residents are black and slightly less than 54 percent are white.
Conclusion
The goal of
achieving educational equity through the judicial and financial systems is
attainable. What Brown initiated; scrutiny of the
equal protection clause in terms of race, has yet to be realized in terms of
wealth. A perusal of the voluminous literature on the subject reveals a very
convoluted, ambiguous, and confusing history. Not only is there disagreement on
what constitutes equality, but how it is to be done. Interpretations of
equality range from the strict constitutional frameworks and rigid fiscal
analysis, to the humanistic social science propositions. It appears that the
legislatures, judges, and educators, are not able to reach an acceptable
standard and measurement. However, while there isn’t a consensus, it is
apparent to decision-makers that public education coddles disparities and
accommodates disequilibrium. Further, most agree that this unequal state of
affairs in education is not desirable and must be corrected. The question then
is what standards and formulas should prevail in the future?
Notes
1. Spring, Joel. American Education. New York: Longmans, 1991, p.
14.
2. Brown v. Topeka Board of Education. Supreme Court of the United
States, 1954.
3. Annual Readings. Guilford: Dushkin, 1990, p. 166.
4. Kluger, Richard. Simple Justice. New York: Alfred Knopf,
1986, p. 93.
5. Spring, Joel. op. cit.,
p. 84.
6. Oakes, Jeannie, “Keeping Track, Part 1. The Policy
and Practice of Curriculum Inequality. “Phi Delta Kappa, Sept. 1986.
7. Kluger, Richard, Interview with Philip Elman,
August 19, 1971, Washington, D.C.
8. Burt, Robert. The Constitution in Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992, p. 27.
9. Kluger, Richard. op. cit.,
p. 144.
10. Ibid., p. 492.
11. Brown v. Topeka Board of Education op. cit..
12. Brown v. Topeka Board of Education. U.S. Supreme Court, 1955.
13. Kluger, Richard. op. cit.,
p. 617.
14. People v. Deatherage. Illinois Supreme Court,
1948.
15. Serrano v. Priest. California Supreme Court, 1971.
16. Coons, John E. and Stephen D. Sugarman. Education By Choice. Berkeley, University of
California, 1978.
17. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. U.S. Supreme Court, 1973.
18. Ibid.
19. Horton v. Meskill. Connecticut Supreme Court, 1989.
Bibliography
Education
1. Levine, Daniel V. and Robert J. Havighurst. Society and Education. Boston: Allyn and Bacon
(1992).
A well organized text that focuses on the sociological
aspects of education. The Chapter on desegregation and educational equality are
extremely relevant in understanding the social dynamics of education.
2. Morris, Arval A. The Constitution and American Public Education. Durham: Carolina Academic
Press, 1989.
3. Read, Arthur and Verna E. Bergemann. In the classroom: An
Introduction to Education. Dushkin, Guilford, 1991.
This book is a comprehensive overview on the purposes
and practices of education.
4. Spring, Joel. American Education. An Introduction to Social and
Political Aspects.
New York: Longmans, 1991. This informative post-modern textbook addresses the
power and control in the political, social and economic realms.
School Finance
1. Coons, John E. Education By Choice: The Case for Family
Control.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
2. Coons, John E., William H. Clune, and Stephen D.
Sugarman. Private
Wealth and Public Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
3. Wise, Arthur E. Rich Schools Poor Schools: The Promise of
Equal Educational Opportunity. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
School Financing and Equality in Connecticut
1. Connecticut Department of Education, Student Rights and
Responsibilities.
Hartford: 1985.
2. Connecticut State Register and Manual. Hartford: 1988.
3. Local Public School Expenditures and State Aid in Connecticut. Hartford: CPEC 1974-88.
4. Tirrozi, Gerald. “Circular Letter C5” LAUS 12,
1989.
5. Tracy, Stephen C. School Finance Reform in Connecticut. Ann Arbor: University
Microfilms International, 1984.
Desegregation and Inequality
1. Lukas, J. Anthony. Common Ground. New York: Knopf, 1985.
2. Kluger, Richard Simple Justice: A History of Brown vs. Board
of Education and Black Americans Struggle for Equality. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.
© 2005 by the Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute